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Defending Breakthrough Innovation: The History 
and Future of State Patent Law 
 
Max Stul Oppenheimer 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Congress, while enacting at least six major revisions to patent law since 1793, has left the 
definition of patentable subject matter essentially unchanged. The Supreme Court, on the other 
hand, has been uncomfortable with the concept for more than a century. Despite this long-
standing discomfort, it has struggled to advance a theoretical basis for its concern. In a series of 
recent cases, it has finally developed a theory as to why certain types of inventions, although 
embraced by the statutory definition, are nonetheless unpatentable. The theory, in effect, 
abandons the federal government’s role in protecting those inventions. This article explores the 
consequences of the resulting vacuum and challenges the conventional wisdom that patents are 
purely federal and purely statutory. 
 
Part II of this article traces the history of the statutory concept of patentable subject matter and 
the judicial efforts to narrow this definition. Part III of this article reviews the current Supreme 
Court theory. Part IV analyzes the consequences of that theory from a federalism perspective and 
argues that, by creating a federal vacuum, the Court has opened the door for state patent laws. 
Part V outlines how certain states can take advantage of this opening and deals with some 
anticipated objections to this proposal.  
 
II. Patent Theory and History 
 
A. The Economic Role of Patents 
 
Patents are, in essence, government-sanctioned monopolies.1 They existed in 18th century 
                                                 
1 The Supreme Court has held that  
A patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly . . . . The term ‘monopoly’ connotes the giving of 
an exclusive privilege for . . . a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a 
monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it 
enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum 
of human knowledge.  
United States v. Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). However, a U.S. patent gives its owner the right to 
stop others from making, using, selling, or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). Violation 
of this right gives rise to damages and (subject to equitable considerations) injunctions. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012); 
eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). It is therefore a challenge to competition, even if not 
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England,2 and were granted by both colonial state governments and states under the Articles of 
Confederation.3 In Thomas Jefferson’s words, they were intended to provide an incentive for 
“things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”4 
 
Inventors have two options for profiting from their work: they can keep the work confidential 
and rely on trade secret protection, or they can commercialize the work publicly. Confidential 
commercialization is often an attractive option for innovators. As long as the requirements for 
trade secrecy are met, 5 a trade secret may be maintained indefinitely and competitors may be 
prevented from using the trade secret information to compete.6  
 
                                                 
“accurately speaking” a monopoly, and the Court has certainly noted the tension between patent rights and antitrust 
concerns. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966). 
2 Early English patents were monopolies on existing articles, granted as royal favors. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 
(2 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1829); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
1, 12 (1994). By the time of the American Revolution the system had been changed by the decision in Darcy v. 
Allein, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., (invalidating a patent granted by Queen Elizabeth I on 
playing cards) and by the Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.), both of which invalidated “royal 
favor” patents but allowed patents awarded to an inventor. 
3 South Carolina had a general patent statute which provided: “The Inventors of useful machines shall have a like 
exclusive privilege of making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same 
privileges and restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.” An Act for the Encouragement 
of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. L. 343–44 (1784). Georgia, Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of 
Literature and Genius, and New Hampshire, Act of November 7, 1783, for the Encouragement of Literature and 
Genius, had intellectual property statutes broad enough to cover both copyrights and patents. Article II of the 
Articles of Confederation reserved to the states all rights not expressly granted to the national government and there 
are records confirming that several states made use of that right: a 1780 Pennsylvania patent for a process for 
tanning, Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, Vol. 10, p. 132 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders 
eds., 1904); a 1786 South Carolina patent for waterworks useful in producing rice, Statutes at Large of South 
Carolina, Vol. 4, 755 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1838); Statutes at Large of South Carolina, Vol. 5, 69 (Thomas Cooper 
ed., 1839); a 1787 Maryland patent for a cotton and wool carding machine, Laws of Maryland, Vol. 2, Session of 
Nov. 6, 1786–Jan. 20, 1787, 23 (William Kilty ed., 1800); and a 1787 Pennsylvania patent for a flour mill device, 
Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, Vol. 12, 483–84 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds.). 
The right to grant patents was not among the rights granted to the national government, leaving the power with the 
states. 
4 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former U.S. President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976. 
5 The requirements for trade secrecy are that the information sought to be protected derives value from not being 
generally known to, or readily ascertainable by proper means by, others who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and that the owner take reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 
1(4). A public disclosure, such as occurs when a patent is published, would therefore destroy it by making it “readily 
ascertainable”. 
6 Id. Thomas Duston & Thomas Ross, Intellectual Property for Trade Secrets and Know-How, IPO ASS’N, 
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/IP_Protection_for_Trade_Secrets_and_Know-how1076598753.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2016). The requirements for maintaining a trade secret are solely that valuable confidential 
information is not publicly known and the owner is taking reasonable steps are taken to maintain its confidentiality – 
there is no time limit. 
  
3 
Most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the protection of 
trade secret law.7 Thus, products that inherently reveal such secrets are difficult to commercialize 
while maintaining trade secrecy. However, there are technologies of extreme value that can be 
commercialized without providing a product that can be reverse-engineered. For example, if an 
inventor devises a process or machine that makes it cheaper to produce an existing product, it is 
possible to keep the means of production as a trade secret while profiting through the sale of the 
end product. Aided by provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, computer software 
can be sold without disclosing its secrets by selling only executable code or by providing 
services, like cloud computing or smartphone applications, which utilize the software. In this 
way, many valuable inventions lend themselves to commercialization without surrendering trade 
secrecy.  
 
Public commercialization, on the other hand, is of greater benefit to society because it allows 
others to learn from the invention and build upon it.8 Public disclosure, however, irrevocably 
surrenders the invention’s trade secrets.9 Thus, without some other form of protection, 
competitors who learn the invention’s secrets through disclosure could make use of them without 
expending the time and money that the innovator spent to develop them. In economic terms, this 
would give the competitor a pricing advantage, because the competitor would not need to 
recover research and development costs. This reduces the incentive to innovate.10  
 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution recognizes this tension between private and 
public interests and authorizes Congress to provide a substitute for trade secret protection. By 
authorizing the right to exclude competitors from the use of an innovation for a limited time in 
exchange for disclosing how to make and use the innovation in a patent application,11 the 
Intellectual Property Clause offers compensation for the loss of trade secret rights,12 thus 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act prohibits 
acquisition of trade secrets by improper means. Misappropriation may be enjoined or give rise to damages. UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2(a) and 3(a). Misappropriation is defined as “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a 
person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means.” Id. § 1(2)(i). 
8 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the 
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ’to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . 
.’”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 
U.S. 502, 511 (1917). 
9 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 
10 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 486. 
11 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (2012). 
12 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a “trade secret” as:  
[I]nformation . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (emphasis added) and provides remedies, including damages, for 
misappropriation of trade secrets.  Id. § 3.  Issued patents, and some unissued patent applications, are published, 
thereby destroying the associated trade secrets by making them generally known and as a failure to make reasonable 
efforts to maintain their secrecy.  In return for the destruction of the trade secrets contained in the patent, the federal 
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increasing the incentive to not only innovate, but also to share that innovation and thereby assist 
other innovators. 
 
Disclosure is thought to benefit society more than maintaining a trade secret, because disclosure 
permits more people to use the information as a starting point for further innovation.13  
 
An inventor: 
 
may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its 
disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. . . . 
[U]pon the expiration of [the patent], the knowledge of the invention inures to the 
people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.14 
 
The compensation offered by the Intellectual Property Clause and the resultant incentives apply 
to only those categories of innovation that Congress decides to protect pursuant to constitutional 
authorization. Other categories of innovation will not be incentivized. As a result, these 
unprotected categories are less likely to be disclosed; those technologies that cannot be 
commercialized without disclosure may even fail to get the funding necessary for their 
development.15 
 
Thus, a U.S. patent may be thought of as a bargain—an exchange of a federally granted 
monopoly with a limited term in return for the surrender of trade secret rights in confidential 
information beneficial to the promotion of progress in the useful arts and sciences. 
 
B. Pre-Constitutional History 
 
Patents existed both in 18th century England and in the colonies. 
 
The earliest English patents bore little resemblance to today’s patents, other than granting 
exclusive rights. These patents were a way to reward friends of the crown (at no cost to the 
                                                 
patent statue grants a limited monopoly by creating a right to prevent infringement of the patent, 35 U.S.C. § 271 
and the right to obtain monetary damages for infringement.  35 U.S.C. § 284. 
13 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
14 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933). 
15 One important industry that exists only because of the availability of patent protection is the pharmaceutical 
industry. A widely-cited estimate of the cost of developing a new drug is $2.6 billion. Rick Mullin, Tufts Study 
Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.html. An industry aphorism states that it 
costs $999,999,999 to produce the first tablet and $1 to produce the second. Drug pricing must spread the 
development cost over subsequent sales, leading to prices well above the incremental cost or production. If a 
competitor could await an innovator’s development of a new drug and simply copy it without incurring development 
costs, the competitor would not need to build those costs into its pricing and it is doubtful that any company would 
ever develop a new drug. 
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monarch)16 by granting the exclusive right to manufacture a particular article or carry on a 
specific trade, thereby guaranteeing the grantee monopoly prices by eliminating competition. 
They were usually not related to any role that the grantee had played in inventing the article or 
establishing the trade.17 A classic example was Queen Elizabeth I’s grant of the exclusive right to 
manufacture playing cards, which was challenged and invalidated in Darcy v. Allein.18 The 1623 
Statute of Monopolies19 put an end to such patents. Both the Darcy case and the Statute of 
Monopolies were careful to distinguish, however, between “royal favor” patents, which were 
invalidated, and patents granted for inventing (or being the first to import) a new technology, 
which remained valid. 
 
It was the post-Statute of Monopolies concept of patents that applied in the colonies. However, 
patents do not appear to have been common during the colonial period. Several colonial patents 
are identified in Goldstein v. California,20 but it is difficult to find any record of patent litigation 
preceding the Constitution.21 
 
The Articles of Confederation reserved to the states all rights not expressly granted to the 
national government.22 The right to grant patents was not among the rights granted to the 
national government, leaving the power with the states.23 This resulted in differing levels of 
protection. For example, South Carolina enacted a general patent statute which stated, “The 
Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of making or vending their 
machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same privileges and restrictions hereby 
granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books,”24 while both Georgia25 and New Hampshire26 
enacted general intellectual property statutes broad enough to cover patents. In contrast, 
Maryland27 and North Carolina28 had constitutional provisions dating to 1776 that appear to 
                                                 
16 It is interesting that the United States patent system adopted a similar approach to incentivizing innovation. Rather 
than pay for rewards out of government funds, both systems shift the expense to the marketplace by foreclosing 
competition, thereby allowing the holder of a patent to obtain a reward by charging monopoly prices. 
17 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1829); Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 12. 
18 Darcy v. Allein, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b. 
19 Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).  
20 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973). 
21 Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 16. Even under the first patent statute under the Constitution, few patents were 
granted. In the three years of operation under the 1790 statute, fifty-five patents were issued. In contrast, in 2015, the 
most recent year for which statistics are available, 578,802 utility patents were issued. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, 
Calendar Years 1963 - 2014, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
22 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. II. 
23 Id. 
24 An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. Laws 343–44 (1784). 
25 Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, reprinted in ROBERT ATKIN ET AL., A 
DIGEST OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 323 (1800). 
26 Act of November 7, 1783, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (repealed 1842). 
27 The Maryland Declaration of Rights declared that “monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free 
government, and the principles of commerce; and ought not to be suffered.” MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIX. 
28 The North Carolina Constitution provided that “perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free 
State, and ought not to be allowed.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII. 
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prohibit the grant of patents. 
 
C. The Constitution 
 
The problems facing an inventor under the Articles of Confederation would have tracked the 
general problems facing the country under the Articles. Competition between almost-sovereign 
states and a lack of uniform laws would have hampered enforcement of patent rights just as they 
hampered development of a strong national economy. State-by-state patent rights meant 
enforcement was limited to comparatively small markets.29 As James Madison noted, “The 
States cannot separately make effectual provision for either [patents or copyrights].”30 
 
The Intellectual Property Clause31 emerged from the Constitutional Convention, but little is 
known about how the clause was drafted or what the drafters intended.32 James Madison did 
comment in The Federalist that the “utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The 
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. 
The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.”33 
 
The first indication that the Convention was concerned about protection of intellectual property 
appears in the records of August 18, 1787, when it was proposed that the federal government 
have the power “[t]o encourage . . . the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries . . . 
[and] [t]o grant patents for useful inventions.”34 The proposal was referred to the Grand 
Committee of Eleven in that form on August 31, 1787.35 The patent language, in particular, 
                                                 
29 This is perhaps the reason why Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 1–2, was unable to find any record of patent 
litigation before the adoption of the Constitution. 
30 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 222 (James Madison) (George W. Carey and James McClellan ed., 2001). 
31 Article I, Section 8, Clause 2, gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
32 No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has left any record concerning the interpretation or meaning placed 
on the intellectual property clause by the delegates themselves.” Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created 
Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995). See generally 
Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 31–34; see also Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative 
Power: the Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1141 
(2000) and cases collected in Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the 
Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 472–79 (2007) [hereinafter Oppenheimer I]. A 
compelling argument for this lack of interest is offered by Edward C. Walterscheid: “the delegates were tired [and] 
wanted to go home . . . .” Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26.  
33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 30, at 222. 
34 James Madison, Journal Saturday August 18. 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
321, 321–22 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937); see also Kevin D. Galbraith, Note, Forever on the Installment Plan? 
An Examination of the Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders’ Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1119, 1140 (2002). 
35 The Grand Committee of Eleven comprised one member from each state except Rhode Island and New York, 
which did not have delegates present at the time. See Galbraith, supra note 34, at 1136.  
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appears to have been added in committee with no record of who made the addition or why.36 On 
September 5, 1787, the Committee of Eleven presented the Intellectual Property Clause to the 
Convention in its final form,37 and on September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement 
presented the Constitution, including the clause, to the Convention. On September 17, the clause 
was approved unanimously without debate or any other record of why the interim language 
changes were made.38  
 
D. The Legislative Creation of the Statutory Subject Matter Requirement 
 
Whatever the reason for the inclusion of the Intellectual Property Clause or the particular 
language chosen at the Constitutional Convention, Congress exercised the power promptly. The 
Patent Act of 1790 was passed in the second term of Congress’ first session,39 and it created a 
committee,40 which had the power to grant patents to anyone who “hath . . . invented or 
discovered any useful art, manufacture, . . . or device, or any improvement therein not before 
known or used . . . if [any two members] shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently 
useful and important.”41 Statutory subject matter42 thus originally consisted of art,43 
manufactures, and devices. 
 
The meaning of statutory subject matter lies at the heart of the patent system. Although there is 
no statutory basis for elevating any requirement over others, some courts have viewed statutory 
                                                 
36 Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 71 AM. SCI. 500, 500 (1983) 
(“The absence of debate over the patent provision . . . has been taken as proof of their firm belief in patents as the best 
way to encourage socially beneficial innovation. However, it is more likely that the authors of the Constitution simply 
followed the English precedent without paying much attention to the subject, since they were also faced with the larger 
problems of how to structure the government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend the new nation.”). 
37 See Galbraith, supra note 34, at 1140. 
38 Id. at 1140–41. On September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to the full Convention the 
entire Constitution, which contained the clause with the language unchanged from the September 5 version. Id. On 
September 17, the Constitution was adopted and signed by the delegates, and there was no recorded debate of the 
Copyright Clause. Id. See also Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26. 
39 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
40 The committee was composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney 
General. See id. at 109–10. The composition of the committee, and the other demands on the time of cabinet 
members, may in part explain why only 47 patents were issued in the three years the statute was in effect. U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO PRESENT (2016), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.pdf. 
41 § 1, 1 Stat. at 110. 
42 Statutory subject matter refers to the types of inventions which may be patented. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
182 (1981). Additional requirements limit which of these types of inventions may in fact be granted a patent, but no 
invention may be patented which is not within the definition of statutory subject matter. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, 
unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”). 
43 At the time of enactment of the 1790 statute, “art” meant “process” (the term used in the current statute). Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 182–84 (holding that the 1952 statutory change from “art” to “process” was simply a modernization of 
the eighteenth century terminology). 
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subject matter as a “gatekeeper.”44 It is, if nothing more, a reflection of Congress’s policy 
decision as to what types of inventions may be patented and thereby incentivized. Other 
countries have created technology-specific exclusions from patentability, with the most common 
being computer software and biotechnology, industries in which U.S. companies hold dominant 
positions and which are major contributors to the U.S. economy.45 Congress has likewise shown 
itself capable of providing technology-specific exceptions when it chooses to do so, but it has 
limited these exceptions to the relatively economically unimportant markets of nuclear 
weaponry, tax strategies, and medical procedures.46 
 
The current definition of statutory subject matter is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which lists four 
categories of statutory subject matter that may be patented: machines, manufactures, 
compositions of matter, and processes.47 
 
While the 1790 statute did not include “compositions of matter,” contemporary English 
precedent would have included it within the term “manufacture.”48 Likewise, the 1790 statute did 
not use the word “process,” but contemporary precedent would have included it in the term 
“art.”49 
                                                 
44 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing en banc by 
No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 68845 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and opinion revised and superseded by 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 101 is 
a threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability), abrogated sub nom. In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The first door which 
must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101.”), vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
444 U.S. 1028 (1980). 
45 See Kimberly Amadeo, Components of GDP: Explanation, Formula and Chart, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/components-of-gdp-explanation-formula-and-chart-3306015 (last updated Oct. 28, 
2016); Robert Carlson, Estimating the Biotech Sector’s Contribution to the US Economy, 34 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 247-55 fig. 4 (2016); The Bloomberg Innovation Index, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-countries/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). For examples of 
exclusions from patentability in other countries, see Oppenheimer I, supra note 32, at 454 nn.36–37. 
46 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents, Taxes, and the Nuclear Option: Do We Need a “Tax Strategy Patent” Ban 
Treaty?, 1 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 28 (2008); James R. Newman and Byron S. Miller, The Control of Atomic Energy: 
A Study of Its Social, Economic, and Political Implications (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948); John Raidt, Patents 
and Biotechnology, U.S. CHAMBER COM. FOUND., https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/patents-and-biotechnology 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing the “narrowly tailored” exemption provided to medical procedures and its 
application). Tax strategy patents and claims “directed to or encompassing a human organism” are specifically 
excluded from patentability. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327–
28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). Nuclear weapons technology is likewise excluded from patentability. 
42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2012). In addition, Congress has denied remedies for infringement of medical procedure patents. 
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2012). 
47 “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The list is exhaustive. 
“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the 
express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .” Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 483. 
48 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring).  
49 Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853) (“[A] process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our 
act of Congress. It is included under the general term ‘useful art.’”); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 
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The second patent statute, enacted in 1793,50 explicitly added the term “composition of matter” 
to the list of statutory subject matter.51 It also established a registration system under which an 
applicant needed only to allege having “invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter, not known or used before the application”52 and “present a petition to 
the Secretary of State.”53 The Secretary of State was authorized to issue a patent without any 
examination of the validity of the applicant’s allegations,54 leaving issues of validity to the court 
system and subsequent litigation.55  
 
Thus, the 1793 definition of statutory subject matter remained unchanged until 195256 when 
Congress replaced the word “art” with “process” and defined the term “process,”57 changes that 
were not meant to change the definition substantively.58 
 
                                                 
(1876) (“A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. . . . If new and useful, it is 
just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art.”); Tilghman v. Proctor, 
102 U.S. 707, 722–23 (1880) (“A manufacturing process is clearly an art . . . .”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
184 (1981) (“Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a ‘process’ did not change with the 
addition of that term to § 101.”). 
50 Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19 (repealed 1836). 
51 The 1793 statute provided:  
That when any person . . . being a citizen . . . of the United States, shall allege that he . . . [has] 
invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or 
used before the application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of State, . . . it shall and 
may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out . . . .  
Id. at 318–20. 
52 Id. The language limits patents to invention not known or used before filing of the application. This must have 
been intended to mean “not known or used by others” since clearly the inventor knew of the invention before filing 
the application. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 As a result of the lack of examination before issuing patents, “a great number of lawsuits arise, which are daily 
increasing in an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society.” Sen. John 
Ruggles, Senate Report Accompanying S. 239, 24th Cong. at 3–4 (1st Sess. 1836), reprinted in DONALD CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 12 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2000). The patent statute was amended in 1836 to address 
these problems by creating a Patent Office to evaluate patent applications. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 
119–20. 
56 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792. Congress also amended the patent statute in 1836 and 1848, but neither 
amendment affected the definition of statutory subject matter. The 1836 amendments were largely directed to 
eliminating abuses by establishing a Patent Office to review applications and determine patentability. Patent Act of 
1836, ch. 357 5 Stat. 117. The 1848 Act provided for publication of patents. Patent Act of May 27th, 1848, 6 Stat. 
231. 
57 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2015). 
58 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (“[A] process has historically enjoyed patent protection because it 
was considered a form of ‘art’ as that term was used in the 1793 Act.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980). 
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In the most recent major review of the patent statute in 2011, Congress left the definition of 
statutory subject matter unchanged. 59  
 
Although there have been at least four major overhauls of the patent statute (instances in which 
Congress certainly would have reviewed the definition of statutory subject matter), the current 
statutory language differs from the original language in only two respects: the addition of the 
category “composition of matter” in 1793 and the change from “art” to “process” in 1952, both 
of which have been held to be non-substantive.60 
 
Certainly nothing in the statutory development suggests Congressional intent to exclude laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas from the definition per se.61 In fact, the legislative 
history suggests a broad reading of the four categories of statutory subject matter now 
                                                 
59 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327–28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101). The Act created an explicit exception excluding tax strategy inventions from eligibility by amending the 
rules for evaluating prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, and established a process for reviewing patentability 
of business methods, but did not change the fundamental definition of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 
101. Id. 
60 While the 1790 statute did not explicitly include “compositions of matter,” this category was, under English 
precedent, considered to be within the term “manufacture.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., 
concurring). Processes, though not mentioned in the 1793 statute, were considered patentable subject matter. In 
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854), the Court held “[a] process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a 
patent in our act of Congress. It is included under the general term ‘useful art.’” In Cochrane v. Deener, the Court 
held:  
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used, 
cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and 
reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of 
machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art.  
94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876). In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 723 (1880), the Court held, “That a patent can 
be granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and new 
compositions of matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is clearly an 
art . . . .” Finally, in Diamond v. Diehr, the 1952 statutory change from “art” to “process” was held as simply 
modernizing the eighteenth century term “art” which, in contemporary terminology would have included processes. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). “Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a ‘process’ did not change 
with the addition of that term to § 101.” Id. at 184.  
61 Other sections of the patent statute place limits on patentability. Under 35 U.S.C. § 111, patent applications must 
be submitted in writing, and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the application must be detailed enough to demonstrate that the 
applicant has possession of the invention and can describe how to make and use it. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the 
application must demonstrate novelty, while 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires that the claimed invention be non-obvious. 
These limits, however, are technology-neutral; they do not preclude patentability of specific types of inventions. See 
generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 
(2002) (discussing the technology-neutral theory of patent law in comparison to the technology-specific application 
of patent law). Congress has imposed technology-specific statutory exclusions, showing that they are quite capable 
of excluding things from patentability when they choose to do so. See id. at 1190–96. These exclusions share no 
common theoretical basis—they are simply examples of case-by-case lobbying power. See N. Telecom, Inc. v. 
Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing an approach whereby courts would look to the level 
of skill in each case to reach a decision). 
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enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Yet, the Supreme Court has announced these three exceptions to 
the broad language of the statute.62 These exceptions emerged in an ad hoc fashion, leaving 
researchers uncertain as to what categories of technology can be protected (and therefore what 
research might be justified economically).63 
 
E. The Ad Hoc Development of the Judicial Exceptions to Statutory Subject Matter 
 
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit has reasonably asked, “why should some categories of 
invention deserve no protection?”64 A sufficient, although simplistic, answer is, “because 
Congress decided to impose it, and the Constitution gave Congress that power.” 
 
Determining why some categories of invention should be excluded from protection by judicial 
exception is a more complicated issue. There are two possible justifications for judicial 
introduction of exceptions to the congressional definition of statutory subject matter: (1) the 
statute is ambiguous and requires interpretation; or (2) the statute, although clear, must be limited 
as a matter of constitutional law.65 The justification matters. If it is merely a matter of ambiguity, 
then Congress (and Congress alone) can direct a contrary conclusion; however, if it is 
constitutionally mandated, then Congress is without power to overcome the exceptions—and the 
power resides with the states. 
 
The development of judicial exceptions has been ad hoc. Each of the three categories of 
exceptions developed mostly independently for 150 years before the Court finally offered an 
overarching theory as to why these particular exceptions should exist.  
 
Notwithstanding repeated admonitions to the lower courts not to read words into the patent 
statute,66 the Court itself has created three exceptions to the clearly established categories of 
statutory subject matter in § 101: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.67 The 
difficulties in defining the scope of statutory subject matter stem from these three exceptions, 
and these exceptions have arguably delayed the development of the software, biotech, and 
                                                 
62 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
63 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Oppenheimer II]. 
64 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
65 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). “Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining 
patentable subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing, 
our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and 
statutory purpose.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). 
66 The Supreme Court has “more than once cautioned that ‘courts “should not read into the patent laws limitations 
and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”’” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted). 
67 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Laws of nature “are part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). See also Diehr, 450 
U.S. at 187–88; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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nanotechnology industries.68 The Court’s particular intervention disincentivizes innovation and 
runs counter to the constitutional mandate to promote progress because withdrawing patent 
protection withdraws the incentive to disclose. 
 
The Court had addressed the issue of statutory subject matter directly69 and tangentially70 more 
than a dozen times. 
 
1) Scientific Principles and Ideas 
 
The Court’s exploration of the meaning of “statutory subject matter” began with a series of 
decisions in the 1850s.71 The Court opined that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental 
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them 
an exclusive right”72 and that “[i]t is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or 
means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the result or 
effect itself.”73 
 
The Court explained the distinction between understanding a scientific principle and finding a 
use for the principle in O’Reilly v. Morse,74 the 1853 case determining the scope of patentability 
of Samuel Morse’s telegraph. Morse had claimed his invention in several ways: (1) as “a process 
of using electromagnetism to produce distinguishable signs for telegraphy;”75 (2) as a “system of 
signs, consisting of dots, spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences, 
substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic purposes;”76 and (3) as “the use of 
the motive power of the electro or galvanic current, which [he] call[ed] electro-magnetism, 
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any 
distances.”77 The Court found the first two formulations of the invention patentable and the third 
unpatentable, distinguishing between patentable specific uses of electromagnetism and 
                                                 
68 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 59–60 
(2011). 
69 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Lab. Corp. 
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124 (2006); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 
306 U.S. 86 (1939); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); Rubber-
Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 
62 (1853). 
70 See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 
(1933). 
71 In 1853, as now, the patent statute required that the invention for which a patent was sought must be “useful.” 
Section 1(a), Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836)  
72 Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175. Of course, the court’s holding is a tautology. 
73 Corning, 56 U.S. at 268. 
74 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
75 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (citing O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 111). 
76 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62. 
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unpatentable claims to the use of magnetism as a motive power without specifying how it was 
used.78 The Court rejected the third formulation, because it attempted to claim something that 
Morse had not invented and could not describe.79 As the Court observed, “[f]or aught that we 
now know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of 
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any 
part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification.”80 Under today’s 
statute, this same concern raises a possible written description deficiency under 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 
In 1874, the Court declared that “an idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it 
may be made practically useful is.”81 The idea at issue was the creation of a small hole in a 
rubber eraser meant to allow the eraser to fit on the end of a pencil.82 The Court viewed this as an 
unpatentable “idea that if a pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller than itself 
the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and when so attached become convenient for use as an 
eraser”83 – in other words, no more than a recognition of the scientific principle that rubber can 
be stretched around an object and, when released, will contract and grip the object. 
 
In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, the Court was tasked with 
determining the patentability of a claim for a radio antenna produced according to a previously 
known formula.84 The Court assumed that the patent claim covered an invention and was valid,85 
but it nonetheless stated in dictum that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression 
of it, is not patentable, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of 
scientific truth may be.”86 
 
While irrelevant to the resolution of the case before the Court, and supported by no citation of 
authority, this dictum laid the foundation for the Court’s first general exclusion from patentable 
                                                 
78 Id. at 112–13. 
79 “In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not 
invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of opinion that the claim is too 
broad, and not warranted by law.” Id. at 113. 
80 Id.  
81 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 98–99 (1939).  
Carter [the applicant] did not invent the formula. It had been . . . published in a scientific journal 
thirty years before. . . . [and] expressed the scientific truth that when radio activity is projected 
from a charged wire of finite length, i.e., one having standing waves, and having a length of a 
multiple of half wave lengths, the angle between the direction of the principal radio activity and 
the wire is dependent on wave length and wire length, which is a multiple of half wave lengths. . . 
. It is plain, therefore, that the Carter invention, if it was invention, consisted in taking the angle of 
the Abraham formula as the angle between each wire of the V antenna and its bisector.  
Id. at 93–94 (emphasis added). 
85 Id. at 94 (“We assume, without deciding the point, that this advance was invention even though it was achieved by 
the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna.”). 
86 Mackay, 306 U.S. at 94 
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statutory subject matter: scientific principles.87 
 
2) Laws of Nature  
 
The second exclusion from patentable statutory subject matter—laws of nature—was announced 
in 1948 in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant.88 The technology at issue in that case involved 
a bacterial inoculant. Farmers had previously used several different inoculants depending on the 
type of crop they were growing, because they believed they needed to apply each inoculant 
separately because of mutual inhibition.89 The patent applicant had found that several inoculants 
could coexist and therefore be applied in a one-step mixture and claimed the mixture.90 In 
holding the invention unpatentable, the Court chose an expansive rationale—that a combination 
of naturally occurring inoculants was a product of nature and therefore unpatentable, even 
though a narrower ground of decision was available.91 The Court cited no evidence that the 
claimed combination occurred naturally.92 The Court held that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly. . . . If there is to be invention from 
such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful 
end.”93 The Court did not find that the “invention” constituted advancement over what already 
existed in nature: 
 
The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six 
species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. . . . They 
serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort 
of the patentee.94 . . . The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of 
all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.95 
 
                                                 
87 Compare id., with Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1880). 
88 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
89 Id. at 129–30.  
90 Id. at 130. 
91 Concurring in the result, Justice Frankfurter preferred to reach it on enablement grounds rather than limiting the 
definition of statutory subject matter. In his view,  
[i]t only confuses the issue...to introduce such terms as ‘the work of nature’ and the ‘laws of 
nature.’ For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and 
equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature,’ and any patentable 
composite exemplifies in its properties ‘the laws of nature.’  
Id. at 134–35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Instead, he would have found the claim unpatentable because “the strains 
that Bond put together in the product which he patented can be specified only by the properties of the mixture” and 
therefore failed the enablement requirement. Id. 
92 Id. at 130. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 131. 
95 Id. at 130. 
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The conclusion that “manifestations of laws of nature” were “free to all men” established the 
second judicial exemption from the legislative definition of statutory subject matter.96 
 
3) Mathematical Algorithms and Abstract Ideas 
 
In 1972, the Court established the “abstract ideas” exception to patentable statutory subject 
matter when it faced a patent application that claimed a process for converting numbers from 
binary coded decimal format to the binary format used by digital computers.97 The Court in 
Gottschalk v. Benson held that a claim to a computer-implemented method of converting 
numbers was not a patentable invention under § 101.98 Because the method had “no substantial 
practical application except in connection with a digital computer,” it was not limited to a 
specific use and therefore amounted to nothing more than an unpatentable mathematical 
algorithm.99 The Court stated that such a mathematical formula was simply an abstract idea, akin 
to unpatentable phenomena of nature and abstract concepts.100 The court then summarized, 
“[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual 
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”101 
Under this theory, the problem with allowing a patent on the invention was that it “wholly pre-
empt[s]” the use of a mathematical formula and therefore was not patentable subject matter.102 
The Court recognized pre-emption as a new justification for invalidating the patent (without 
engaging in statutory interpretation), describing the claimed mathematical process as “so abstract 
and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary 
conversion.”103 
 
In Parker v. Flook, the Court clarified that a “process is not unpatentable simply because it 
contains a law of nature.”104 The patent at issue included claims to a catalytic conversion process 
that involved the use of a formula, which the Court assumed to be novel and useful, to calculate 
and update “alarm limits.”105 Drawing on the formulation of Benson, the Court explained that 
determining whether a claim containing a mathematical algorithm is statutory subject matter is 
not simply a matter of whether the claim “wholly pre-empts” the mathematical algorithm, but 
whether “once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as 
a whole, contains no patentable invention.”106 Noting that the line between an abstract principle 
and the application of that principle is “not always clear,”107 the Court concluded that the process 
                                                 
96 The statutory section at issue in Funk Bros. was § 31, comparable to § 101 of the statute as revised in 1952. 
97 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64, 67 (1972) (holding “abstract intellectual concepts” unpatentable). 
98 Id. at 71–72. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 67–68. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. at 71–72. 
103 Id. at 68. 
104 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). 
105 Id. at 586–87. 
106 Id. at 594. 
107 Id. at 589. 
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was not statutory subject matter under § 101 since it was merely a mathematical formula, which 
was “not the kind of ‘discover[y]’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”108 
 
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,109 the Court noted that Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope:110 
 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. 
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not 
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that 
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are 
“manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none”.111 . . . 
 
In Diamond v. Diehr, the applicant claimed a process for making molded rubber products, which 
involved monitoring the temperature inside the mold and using a well-known equation to 
calculate the required cure time based on the measured temperature.112 While reiterating that an 
algorithm or mathematical formula is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a 
patent, the Supreme Court held that the claim was valid as “a process of curing synthetic rubber. 
Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to 
pre-empt the use of that equation.”113 
 
In 2010, the Court attempted to clarify its interpretation of § 101 in Bilski v. Kappos.114 The 
applicant claimed a computer-implemented system for hedging risk.115 The patent office and 
lower courts had all held the claims were not statutory subject matter under the abstract ideas 
exception.116 In affirming, the Court summarized: 
 
Section 101 specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that 
are patent eligible . . . “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would 
be given wide scope . . . .” The Court’s precedents provide three specific 
exceptions to § 101’s broad principles: “laws of nature, physical phenomena and 
                                                 
108 Id. at 592–93. 
109 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
110 The Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Act included a statement that “a person may have ‘invented’ a 
machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily 
patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.” S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. 
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The Court interpreted the language as “inform[ing] us that Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’” (first quoting S. REP. NO. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952); and then quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09. 
111 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citations omitted). 
112 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
113 Id. at 187. 
114 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593–94 (2010). 
115 Id. at 593. 
116 Id. 
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abstract ideas.” While not required by the statutory text, these exceptions are 
consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be “new and useful.” 
And in any case, the exceptions have defined the statute’s reach as a matter of 
statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.117 
  
The Court has thus created three broad exceptions to the statutory language. It has acknowledged 
that Congress intended to give patents a wide scope and frequently reminded the lower courts 
that “our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the 
legislative history and statutory purpose.”118 It further acknowledged that its exceptions are “not 
required by the statutory text.” Yet the Court has nonetheless proceeded to announce ad hoc 
exemptions from the unambiguous statutes, without advancing an argument for its power to do 
so. 
 
In Patents 101 I argued that the judicially imposed limits on the statutory language were not 
constitutionally required and represented an unwarranted judicial intrusion into Congress’ role as 
policy maker, in the guise of statutory interpretation.119 The Supreme Court disagreed—
repeatedly.120 In a recent series of cases, the Court finally offered a basis for its authority to 
establish these exemptions. In doing so, it opened a new option for protecting breakthrough 
inventions. 
 
 
III. A Theory at Last 
 
The courts, of course, have the power to review and interpret statutes.121 However, the power to 
intervene and impose a judicial interpretation on a statute, as the Court has done in the creation 
of exceptions to the congressional definition of statutory subject matter, is limited to two 
situations.122 That power arises when a statute is ambiguous and requires interpretation123 and it 
arises when a statute, although unambiguous, must be limited as a matter of constitutional 
constraint.124 Unfortunately, despite repeated review of statutory subject matter cases, the Court 
has never explicitly identified which of these sources of its authority it relies on to override the 
statutory language regarding patentable subject matter. 
                                                 
117 Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
118 Chakrabarty 447 U.S. at 313, 315. 
119 See Oppenheimer II, supra note 63. 
120 See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2012). 
121 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
122 There is a third possibility – the Court is simply wrong and has exceeded its authority to undo a Congressional 
enactment – which is beyond the scope of this article. 
123 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject 
matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing, our obligation is 
to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose.”) 
(emphasis added). 
124 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 
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The source of judicial authority has important consequences. If the Court is acting pursuant to its 
power to interpret an ambiguous statute, then Congress (and Congress alone) can determine that 
the Court has misunderstood Congress’ intent and correct the erroneous judicial interpretation by 
revising the statute. If the Court is acting pursuant to its power to prevent unconstitutional 
application of statutory language, then Congress cannot override the Court’s decision – the only 
way to change the result is by constitutional amendment. 
 
The next two sections examine the applicability of the two available sources of authority to the 
decisions establishing exceptions to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
A. Possibility #1: Are the Judicial Exceptions an Exercise in Interpretation of Ambiguity? 
 
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not appear ambiguous on its face. It lists four categories of 
statutory subject matter and does not exclude “phenomena of nature, mental processes, or 
abstract intellectual concepts.”125 This does not appear to be an oversight on Congress’ part; 
Congress has apparently had no difficulty excluding specific types of inventions that would 
otherwise fit within the four broad statutory categories. It has done so most recently in the 
America Invents Act which explicitly excludes human organisms (which would be compositions 
of matter under Chakrabarty) and tax strategies (which would be processes under State Street 
Bank) from the scope of Section 101.126 
 
The Supreme Court cautioned in Dubilier,127 and repeated in Chakrabarty, that courts “should 
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not 
expressed.”128 Chakrabarty itself appears to find the statutory language unambiguous.129  
 
In Bilski v. Kappos, writing for four members of the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that 
“precedents provide three specific exceptions to §101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws 
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas’” but that “these exceptions are not required 
by the statutory text.”130 
                                                 
125 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
126 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327–28 (2011) (amending 35 
U.S.C. § 101) (declaring tax strategies within the prior art and thereby excluding them from patentability and 
declaring human organisms unpatentable). 
127 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). 
128 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
129 “Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in § 101 . . .” Id. at 315. The 
Court held that the statutory definition was broad enough to cover “anything under the sun that is made by man.” Id. 
at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923). 
130 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy noted that, while not required by 
the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be “new and useful.” This 
observation appears inconsistent with the provisions of Section 100(b), which defines a process as any “process, art 
or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 
Id. at 602 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens, writing for four Justices in a concurring opinion, questioned Kennedy’s 
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In 150 years of Supreme Court review of patentable subject matter cases, not once has the Court 
pointed to an ambiguity in the definition of statutory subject matter or stated that the language 
adopted by Congress is unclear or ambiguous.131 
 
If the statute is not ambiguous, there is only one other source of judicial power to create 
exceptions to Congress’ definition of patentable subject matter, and language in recent cases 
points to this second source of power. 
 
B. Possibility #2: Are the Judicial Exceptions an Exercise of the Power to Find a Statute 
Unconstitutional? 
 
The Court has never explicitly been called upon to rule on the constitutionality of § 101. 
However, statements in recent cases suggest that that is exactly the basis for imposing exceptions 
on the statutory language. 
 
The first hint appeared in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Metabolite, where the Justice argued that the 
Court should have reviewed a lower court’s holding of patentability. Justice Breyer invoked 
constitutional limits to justify the judiciary’s deviation from the literal language of § 101 as 
follows: “the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede 
rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”132 The quoted language is, of 
course, taken directly from the Preamble to Article I §8 of the Constitution. 
 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Justice Breyer, now writing for a 
unanimous court, applied the same reasoning to hold that a method of optimizing a drug dosage 
by administering a dose of the drug to a patient, then testing the patient’s blood and adjusting the 
dosage depending on the results133 was not patentable because, although it was a process,134 it 
was no more than informing a “relevant audience about certain laws of nature” and therefore not 
patentable.135 
 
The same analysis, and the same result, can also be seen in Association for Molecular Pathology, 
                                                 
logic, noting “At points, the opinion suggests that novelty is the clue. . . . But the fact that hedging is ‘long prevalent 
in our system of commerce,’ . . . cannot justify the Court’s conclusion”, as “the proper construction of §101 . . . does 
not involve . . . novelty.” Id. at 620 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring). In any event, the 
theory that the limitations are imposed by another section of the statute, does not appear to have been further 
developed or pursued in subsequent cases. 
131 See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303; Dubilier, 289 U.S. 178; Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix 
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (1992). 
132 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted). 
133 Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295 (2012). 
134 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
135 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
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where the Supreme Court held that a DNA sequence, isolated from the hundreds of millions of 
nucleotide sequences in the human genome and useful in diagnostic testing, was not patentable 
because, however difficult it was to find and isolate, it had always existed as a product of 
nature.136 Again invoking the Constitutional purpose of Art. I Section 8, Justice Thomas wrote 
“[a]s the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the 
grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation 
premised upon them.’. . . This would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to 
promote creation”137 and “as we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a delicate 
balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.’”138 The 
decision where to strike balances is, of course, committed to Congress. Therefore, although 
Justice Thomas does not quote the Constitutional language, the Court must be saying that 
Congress’ language is limited by the Constitutional limitation of using the patent laws to 
“promote progress” (or, in the Court’s words, “innovation,” “creation,” “invention” or 
“discovery”). 
 
Most recently, in Alice v. CLS Bank, Justice Thomas reiterated the theory developed in the above 
cases, this time rejecting a patent as claiming “an abstract idea”, and this time citing the 
constitutional language139: 
 
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption 
. . . the patent “would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively 
grant a monopoly over an abstract idea”. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work.’ “[M]onopolization of those 
tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend 
to promote it,” thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. . . . See U.S. CONST., 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress “shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”). We have ‘repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of’ these building blocks of human 
ingenuity.140 
 
In sum, the current justification supporting exceptions to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. 
§101 is based, not on the need to interpret an ambiguous statute, but rather on the theory first 
advanced in the Breyer dissent in Metabolite: “too much patent protection can impede rather than 
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ’”141 In other words, the Constitution limits 
application of the statute. Thus, while the Court has never stated in explicit terms that the 
statutory language is broader than the Constitution permits, these decisions can only be based on 
                                                 
136 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
137 Id. at 2116. 
138 Id. 
139 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
140 Id. (citations omitted). 
141 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 126-127 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted); see also supra Section III.A (discussing the absence of ambiguity in 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
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the conclusion that, although the clear statutory language142 covers such inventions, laws of 
nature, mathematical algorithms, and abstract principles must be excluded because there is no 
constitutional power for Congress to authorize such patents.  
 
IV. A Federal Vacuum; a State Opportunity 
 
The patent statute is an exercise of power granted to the federal government by Article I section 
8 of the Constitution. Prior to adoption of the Constitution, that power had been held by the 
states under the Articles of Confederation. The Court’s exceptions to the statutory language are, 
in effect, a determination that the Constitution did not grant Congress the power to protect the 
excepted categories of inventions. If the power to grant such patents is denied to the federal 
government because it is not granted by the Constitution, then under the Tenth Amendment it 
remains with the states, where it resided under the Articles of Confederation.143 
 
Thus, by creating a federal vacuum regarding protection of inventions that fall within the 
categories of laws of nature, mathematical algorithms and abstract principles, the Court has 
opened the door for states to adopt patent laws144 protecting such inventions. 
  
The question remains whether any other restraint might stand in the way of state patent 
protection for the excluded categories of invention. Two legal concerns and one practical 
concern must be considered. The legal concerns are whether a state patent system would conflict 
with federal antitrust law and whether such a system would violate the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. The practical concern is whether state patent protection could be implemented, 
or whether potential infringers would easily avoid liability by locating infringing activities 
outside the state. 
 
A. Coexisting with Antitrust Laws 
 
An initial objection might be that state patent rights would be inconsistent with federal antitrust 
laws. Even federally granted patent laws must be reconciled with “this Nation's deep-seated 
antipathy to monopolies.”145 
 
However, even Thomas Jefferson, whose anti-monopoly credentials were unmatched, was 
willing to concede that monopolies had a role in situations where it was necessary to provide 
“the embarrassment of an exclusive patent” for things of worth.”146 
                                                 
142 See supra Section III.A. 
143 See supra Section II.B. 
144 A purist might argue that “patents” can only refer to rights granted by the federal government and that state 
grants might be “patent-like” but would not be patents. For simplicity, this article will refer to the state granted 
rights as “state patent rights.” 
145 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966). 
146 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976. 
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The decision to make patent rights exclusive (whether denominated monopolies or not) is 
consistent with antitrust laws that had already been made. As the Supreme Court has observed, 
  
[a] patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly. . . . The term ‘monopoly’ 
connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for ... something that the public 
freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the 
people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his 
discovery.147  
 
Thus, as long as a state system included requirements similar to the federal novelty and 
obviousness standards, it would not be a monopoly within the definition the Supreme Court has 
established. The resulting question is not whether patent rights can coexist with antitrust laws - it 
is whether the federal government has exclusive domain over granting those rights or whether 
states can also grant such rights. 
 
The answer to that question (and the supremacy objection) turns in part on pre-Constitutional 
history. 
 
Until the adoption of the Constitution, patents were granted by states.148 The Tenth Amendment 
reserves all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution as state 
powers. Supreme Court decisions indicate that granting patent rights was not designated to the 
federal government with respect to certain subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas. 
 
For this reason, the basis for the Supreme Court restrictions on patentable subject matter plays a 
crucial role. If the Court were simply interpreting the Patent Act, there would be a compelling 
argument that the Constitution had completely removed the power to grant patents from the 
states, assigned it to the federal government, and Congress had simply decided not to exercise 
the power to grant patents with respect to certain categories of invention.149 However, if “laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and ideas” are not patentable because they are “the basic tools of 
                                                 
The patent statute is not the only example of federally granted exclusive rights. For example, the Food and Drug 
Administration in effect grants exclusive rights to the first applicant to present a successful application for approval 
of a New Chemical Entities by refusing to approve additional applications for a limited period of time. 21 C. F. R. 
Section 314.108 - New drug product exclusivity. 
147 United States v. Dubilier Condenser, 289 US 178, 186 (1933).  
148 See supra Sections II.B–C. 
149 Congress has this discretion. They have excluded tax strategy patents and claims “directed to or encompassing a 
human organism” from the definition of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327–28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101). Nuclear 
weapons technology is excluded from patentability, although under the Atomic Energy Act rather than the patent 
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2006). Congress has also denied remedies for infringement (although not patentability) of 
medical procedure patents. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2011). 
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scientific and technological work”150 and therefore beyond the patent-granting power bestowed 
by the Constitution,151 then the power to grant patents as to these inventions was not taken from 
the states.152 
 
The only remaining inquiry is whether granting patents for laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas was a power that the states had prior to the Constitution153 – and the answer is 
“yes.” 
 
Patents were issued before the Revolutionary War in England and in the colonies.154 In post-
Revolutionary United States, the Articles of Confederation left the power to grant patents with 
the states155 and at least one state clearly exercised that power by enacting a general patent 
statute.156 New Hampshire and Georgia enacted intellectual property statutes that were broad 
enough to include the power to grant patents.157 Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Maryland 
issued patents under the Articles of Confederation.158 
 
The power thus existed as a state right under the Articles of Confederation and was not 
completely transferred to the federal government by the Constitution. 
 
B. Surviving the Supremacy Clause 
 
The Supremacy Clause raises a related but separate hurdle for a state-granted patent rights 
system. 
 
                                                 
150 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
151 See supra Section III.B. 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
153 Even if the Constitution did not take a power from the states, the states would not have that power unless it was 
theirs to begin with. 
154 Five Colonial patents are mentioned in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973). 
155 Article II of the Articles of Confederation reserved to the states all rights not expressly granted to the national 
government. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. The right to grant patents was not among the granted 
rights.  
156 South Carolina had a statute providing “The Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of 
making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same privileges and restrictions 
hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.” An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 
S.C. Pub. L. No. 1335, 34. 
157 Georgia (Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius) reprinted in ROBERT ATKIN 
ET AL., A DIGEST OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 323 (1800).and New Hampshire (Act of November 7, 1783, for the 
Encouragement of Literature and Genius). 
158 10 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, 132 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders 
eds.,1904) (1780 patent to Guest for a process for tanning); 4 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 755 (Thomas 
Cooper ed. 1838); 5 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 69 (1839) (1786 patent to Belin for waterworks 
useful in producing rice); 2 Laws of Maryland, Session of Nov. 6, 1786-Jan. 20, 1787, ch. 23 (William Kilty ed., 
1800) (1787 patent for cotton and wool carding machine); 12 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, 
483–84 (James Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds.,1906) (1787 patent for a flour mill device). 
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Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”159 
The “notwithstanding” phrase “is a non obstante provision... and instructed courts not to apply 
the general presumption against implied repeals.... The non obstante provision in the Supremacy 
Clause therefore suggests that federal law should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting 
state law.”160 Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are void.161 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized three types of preemption: 
 
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt 
state law. . . . and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit 
statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.  
 
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted 
where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal 
Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a 
“scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or where an 
Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject” although “where . . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-
empted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States, 
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’” 
 
Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal 
law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private 
party to comply with both state and federal requirements. . . . or where state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”162 
 
A) Explicit Preemption 
 
Nothing in the Intellectual Property Clause163 (or any other clause of the Constitution) explicitly 
forbids states from granting patent rights.  
                                                 
159 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
160 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 621–22 (2011) (holding that federal food and drug law, which required 
generic drug manufacturers to use FDA-approved labels, pre-empted state duty-to-warn labeling requirements); see 
also Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466 (2013) 
161 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 
(2000) (“[S]tate law is . . . preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute”). See generally, Caleb 
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
162 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–80 (1990) (citations omitted). 
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The Intellectual Property Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”164 There has been debate as to whether the preamble 
(“to promote the Progress...”) is a limitation on Congress’s power or serves some other purpose. 
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”165 The 
purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause is twofold:  
 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit . . . . [They are] intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control 
has expired.166 
 
The Intellectual Property Clause does not explicitly restrict any state action and does not prohibit 
the federal government from using extra-patent measures to “Promote the Progress.” Indeed, the 
federal government routinely funds programs also designed to improve science and useful arts. 
For example, the National Institutes of Health provides grants for medical research; the 
Advanced Research Project Administration provides grants for emerging technology research; 
and the National Institute for Standards and Technologies funds technological innovation. 
 
B) Exclusive Occupancy Preemption 
 
“[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates 
conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.”167 
 
Congress has clearly left areas of intellectual property law to the states. For instance, state 
trademark law coexists with federal trademark law. State trade secret law functions alongside 
federal patent law.168 
 
There are provisions of federal statutes other than the Intellectual Property Clause, which may 
indicate that Congress meant to regulate patents. For example, a jurisdictional statute appears to 
confer exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over patent matters.169 That statute, however, could 
be read to confer exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over cases involving federal patents. Such 
                                                 
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
165 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
166 Sony Corp. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
167 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
168 See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (sustaining the application of state trade 
secret law to the protection of a process that was patentable but not patented); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989) (invalidating a particular state statute, but noting that trade secret protection 
may “dovetail” with patent incentives). See also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
169 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2011). 
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an interpretation would leave state judicial jurisdiction over state trademark and trade secret 
issues and cases involving state patent rights, because “[wh]ere . . . the field which Congress is 
said to have pre-empted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States, 
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’”170 
 
States were the source of patents granted prior to the Constitution.171 Unlike the most recent 
copyright statute, where Congress clearly pre-empted the entire field with respect to newly 
created works of authorship, Congress has taken no steps to indicate a similar interest in 
regulating the patentability of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ideas,” notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s focus on this area of patentable subject matter. 
 
Finally, if the Constitution did not grant Congress the power to extend federal patent protection 
to “laws of nature, natural phenomena and ideas” then that power remained with the states, 
where it had existed under the Articles of Confederation172 - and there can be no “exclusive 
occupancy preemption” where Congress has no right to occupancy to begin with. 
 
C) Conflict Preemption 
 
The third category of federal preemption is conflict preemption: a state law is preempted if it 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”173 
 
In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, the Court noted, “efficient operation of the federal patent 
system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and 
utilitarian conceptions.”174 However, the Court also noted an appropriate role for state regulation 
of unpatented designs if “necessary to promote goals outside the contemplation of the federal 
patent scheme.”175 If an area is beyond Congress’ constitutional power (and reserved to the 
states), then state regulation in that area is by definition “outside the contemplation of the federal 
patent scheme.”176 
 
Congress’s objective, as expressed in the Patent Act, is to provide patent protection for four 
categories of statutory subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of 
                                                 
170 English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
171 See supra Sections II.B–C. 
172 See supra Section III.B. 
173 English, 496 U.S. at 72. 
174 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989). 
175 Id. at 166. As examples of state regulation that might be permissible, the Court referred to unfair competition, 
trademark, trade dress, and trade secrets laws. Perhaps by way of distinguishing Sears and Compco, both of which 
invalidated use of unfair competition laws, the Court suggested that prevention of “consumer confusion is a 
permissible state goal that can be served in some instances by application of such laws.” Id. at 154. 
176 Id. at 166. 
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matter.177 “[T]he powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary”178 and 
Congress has the “constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter.”179   
 
It is the Supreme Court—not Congress—that has imposed limitations on the clear statutory 
language. These are limitations that the Court views as compelled by constitutional limits on 
Congressional power in the field. State patent rights would therefore be consistent with the 
Congressional goal of filling a gap created by the Court’s view of the limits of the legislature’s 
power. As such, the grant of state patent rights would not violate federal preemption.  
 
V. A Model for State Patents 
 
A. The Opportunity for States 
 
The theory underlying the Supreme Court cases appears to be that some ideas (i.e. principles of 
nature) are so far-reaching that patent law cannot allow inventors to monopolize them.180 The 
rationale finds its most coherent expression in Justice Breyer’s dissent to the dismissal of 
certiorari in Lab Corp.181 In that dissent, Justice Breyer explains that the problem is not that laws 
of nature are easy, inexpensive, or obvious to discover, but rather that allowing them to be 
patented grants too much protection and thereby impedes the exchange of information and 
discourages research.182 
 
Stated differently, breakthrough innovations are too important to patent. Even if the federal 
government is bound by this conclusion, states might well conclude that breakthrough 
                                                 
177 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
178 McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843). 
179 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). 
180 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
130 (1948).  
181 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
182 Id. at 126–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent explains: 
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that “laws of nature” are obvious, or 
that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters 
may be costly and time-consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those 
incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for 
the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than “promote the 
progress of science and useful arts,” the constitutional objective of patent and copyright 
protection.  
 
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing 
monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding 
the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of 
potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of 
existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs 
of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.  
Id. 
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innovations present tremendous potential and should be encouraged - and capitalized: arguably, 
the greater the discovery, the greater the value derived from its disclosure.  
 
In a sense, the same argument advanced by the Supreme Court (that judicial exceptions are 
necessary to prevent monopolization of emerging technologies) is a stronger argument for the 
opposite conclusion. For instance, emerging technologies are riskier investments than established 
technologies. Without guaranteed protection, emerging technologies will have difficulty 
obtaining financing, potentially stifling innovation in the field. If people still chose to innovate 
without patent protection, they must rely on trade secret protection instead.183 Unfortunately, 
“rather than promoting information exchange and technological innovation, trade secrecy 
encourages developers to hoard their inventions; this forces software developers to ‘spend much 
of their efforts reinventing the wheel . . . .’”184 
 
Since only inventions that are protectable are incentivized,185 providing state incentives would 
encourage innovation and disclosure in breakthrough technologies. Justice Burger echoed this 
sentiment in Goldstein v. California.186 There, Justice Burger noted the historical local character 
of patents in the colonial period and under the Articles of Confederation, remarking that “the 
patents granted by the States in the 18th century show … a willingness on the part of the States 
to promote those portions of science and the arts which were of local importance.”187 He 
referenced a 1751 Massachusetts patent for a process for the manufacture of candles out of whale 
oil; a 1780 Pennsylvania patent for the processing of tanning oil and blubber; a 1786 South 
Carolina patent for waterworks which aided in the production of rice, a staple of South Carolina 
agriculture; a 1787 Maryland patent for a spinning and carding machine “to encourage useful 
inventions, as well as promote the manufacture of cotton and wool within this state . . .”; and a 
1787 Pennsylvania patent for a flour mill device that would “tend to simplify and render cheap 
the manufacture of flour which is one of the principal staples of this commonwealth. . . .”188 
 
Given the effect of state patent rights in the past, creating a new system of state patent rights 
would be a return to the system under the Articles of Confederation - with the same problems 
faced under the Articles. 
 
B. Incentives for State Action 
 
The Supreme Court’s statutory subject matter exception has arguably delayed the development 
                                                 
183 See Chad King, Abort, Retry, Fail: Protection for Software-Related Inventions in the Wake of State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1157–58 (2000). 
184 Id. at 1159–60. See also Lee A. Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for Congressional Action on 
Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283, 286 (1996). 
185 See supra Section II.A. 
186 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
187 Id. at 557.  
188 Id. at 557 n.13. 
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of the software, biotech, and nanotechnology industries.189 Patents, by design, inhibit 
competition and thereby give the inventor the opportunity to raise prices during the term of the 
patent. This enhanced revenue opportunity incentivizes investing in unproven technology. 
Rational investors factor in the possibility of greater revenue when evaluating the desirability of 
investing in new research. Without the possibility of greater revenue, the attractiveness of the 
risk/reward ratio is reduced, thus reducing the availability of funding to develop the technology. 
Therefore, the exemptions, by depriving inventors of protection against competition, remove 
incentives for inventing in these fields, perhaps even to the point of preventing promising new 
technologies from ever developing. 
 
The states are in a position to provide this missing incentive by providing protection for this 
previously unprotected subject matter. However, the state-level solution would not be as 
desirable as a federal solution. In effect, state-by-state patent rights would represent a return to 
the Articles of Confederation, with all of the attendant problems. 
 
Since state laws are inherently limited to activity within their state, a system resembling that 
present under the Articles of Confederation would encourage state competition and 
fragmentation of the national market. For example, if a state adopted the full federal catalog of 
patent rights, they would risk discouraging manufacturing within the state.  
 
Indeed, under the Articles, there was no consensus among the states. At least one state had a 
general patent statute,190 two others had an intellectual property statute broad enough to cover 
both copyrights and patents,191 while two others prohibited patents.192 Ideally, there would be a 
consortium of states with common statutes and reciprocity. This would provide the advantages 
that would flow from amending the U.S. patent statute and harmonizing it with international 
norms of predictability and uniformity of processes.193 However, the creation of such a uniform 
system would face challenges. For example, some states have large biotech industries and might 
therefore be inclined to favor extending protection for that industry, while other states have small 
biotech presence but large medical institutions which, as consumers of the innovation, might 
argue for less protection. 
 
                                                 
189 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 59–60 
(2011). 
190 South Carolina had a statute providing “The Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of 
making or vending their machines for the like term of 14 years, under the same privileges and restrictions hereby 
granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.” An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. 
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State, and ought not to be allowed.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII. 
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States could charge a fee for processing patent applications. The resulting potential revenue 
would need to be balanced against possible harm to the state economy. Certain states could, 
however, benefit from granting state patent rights tailored to the specific state’s economy by 
providing, for example, exclusive rights to use an invention in the state, or the right to sell in the 
state. 
 
At least two categories of states could make a state-by-state patent system work. States with 
large economies (for example, California, New York, and Texas) would have the economic 
power, by virtue of the size of their markets, to impose this type of restriction without the risk of 
manufacturers boycotting the state. States with unique, unmovable resources (for example, Johns 
Hopkins in Maryland) could also impose these restrictions because of the enormous cost of 
relocating the resources. 
 
C. Designing a Constitutional State Patent System 
 
States wanting to create their own patent systems would face inherent constraints. The systems 
could, of course, only apply to activities within the state. They could, however, cover not only 
manufacture within the state, but also use or sale within the state, much as the federal patent 
statute covers patented inventions manufactured outside the United States but imported into, 
used or sold within the United States.194 
 
State systems could only cover inventions that the Constitution did not commit to federal 
jurisdiction – those excluded from statutory subject matter by the Supreme Court’s exceptions.195 
 
To avoid preemption issues, the state systems should be compatible with the federal 
constitutional objectives of motivating innovation and disclosure.196 A safe course would be to 
track the federal system by using a limited patent term (although the constitutional restriction to 
limited terms applies only to Congress, not to the states) and a patent application examination 
system assuring that state patents are only awarded for truly innovative discoveries.  
 
The federal patent statute creates several patentability hurdles. To be patentable the invention 
must fall within the categories of patentable subject matter,197 and the invention must be 
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useful,198 novel,199 and nonobvious.200 The applicant for a patent must supply a written 
description of the invention sufficient to teach others how to make and use it.201 These 
requirements should be incorporated in a state system because they are sound policy and 
desirable (if not necessary) to be consistent with the federal scheme and therefore lawful under 
the Supremacy Clause.202 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
It is unfortunate that the framers left virtually no record of deliberations concerning the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.203 Surely they knew how invention fueled the 
success of England’s industrial revolution, and the framers must have realized the limited 
resources available to the nation. It would certainly be helpful to know if the framers thought 
that, given the importance of incentivizing innovation, the power to grant copyrights and patents 
should be exclusively a federal power; or, given the limited resources available to the federal 
government (and the far more pressing demands on those resources than providing incentives for 
innovation), it would be helpful to know if the framers thought that state incentives were a 
valuable tool to be used alongside federal incentives. 
 
Judging solely by the written record, it is likely that they did not consider the question directly. 
 
Without any evidence, one is left to look for inferential clues. The first clue is the lack of records 
itself. If protection of intellectual property were thought essential to the success of the federal 
government, one would expect that there would be more robust record of discussions concerning 
the Intellectual Property Clause. A second clue is co-existence, because for much of the nation’s 
history, state common law copyrights existed alongside federal copyrights.204 This shows a lack 
of concern over shared control of copyrights, and since the power to grant copyrights and patents 
arises under the same clause of the Constitution, it is reasonable to conclude that shared control 
could apply to patents as well. A third clue is the existence of state patents under the Articles of 
Confederation (and before), and the Tenth Amendment reservation of state powers not granted to 
the federal government.205 
 
It is fair to ask why, if the states had the power, none have exercised it to date. One explanation 
would be that to the extent that the federal statute provides adequate incentive to innovate, there 
is no need for states to intrude.  This would have been a reasonable explanation until the 
emergence of the “too much protection” theory which developed from the dissent in 
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Metabolite.206 
 
It is the emergence, and subsequent adoption, of the Metabolite theory, that grants the state 
power to issue patents and creates the need for the exercise of such power. The theory itself – 
that “too much protection” interferes with progress – certainly has the ring of truth. It ignores, 
however, the fundamental observation that “[a]n inventor deprives the public of nothing which it 
enjoyed before his discovery . . . .”207 Thus even a broad discovery that preempts a broad field 
for a limited period of time does not necessarily inhibit progress, since there is no way to know 
whether the field would even exist absent the broad discovery, nor can the importance of the 
field be assessed except in hindsight. 
 
The Supreme Court has ruled that certain categories of invention cannot be patented at the 
federal level, but has provided no reason to believe that progress in those fields will not suffer for 
lack of incentive. The states are in a position, by virtue of the exclusions created by the Supreme 
Court, to supply incentives which the federal government cannot. 
 
To be sure, the states are constrained in the design of such incentive systems,208 but it is possible 
to design incentive systems within those constraints.209 Not all states have equal ability to 
participate, but the states nonetheless have an opportunity to contribute to the continued 
“Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 
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